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Recent research emphasizes that legitimacy depends on
consensus among agents (audiences) about the features
and activities of organizations (candidates) that become
taken-for-granted elements in a social domain. This study
examines how consensus is affected by the structure of
interaction in the network connecting social audiences to
candidate organizations. It analyzes how audience mem-
bers reach, reinforce, and preserve consensus about can-
didates’ features and behavior, affecting a crucial organi-
zational outcome, survival. The findings show that
survival is enhanced by the degree of connectivity and
the repeated interactions between audience members
and candidate organizations and is reduced by the degree
of turnover of audience members. We situate our analysis
in the U.S. motion picture industry, where we trace the
interorganizational network between feature film produc-
er organizations (candidates) and distributor organiza-
tions (the audience) and its influence on producer organi-
zations’ exit rates over the period 1912–1970. We find
strong support for the claim that the legitimation process
has a relational foundation that involves ties between
organizational entities and the external others with whom
they interact. The results contribute to the dialogue
between ecological and network theories of organizations
and support the claim that legitimation has a relational
foundation involving ties between organizations and
audiences.•
Building and sustaining organizations depends on the avail-
ability of environmental resources, and legitimation signifies
the process by which social acceptance (or legitimacy) facili-
tates organizations’ task of accessing these resources
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Weber, 1968). Legitimacy also grants
organizations the capacity to defend their claims on
resources against other contending social units (Hannan and
Carroll, 1992; Scott, 1995; Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007).
As a necessary condition for creating and maintaining steady
resource flows from the environment (Meyer and Rowan,
1977), legitimacy is directly linked to organizational outcomes
such as vital rates of founding and mortality (Carroll and Han-
nan, 2000).
Sociologists fundamentally consider legitimation a collective
process that implies the presence of both social audiences
and social objects being evaluated and that depends on audi-
ences’ consensus about what features and actions these
objects should have to be accepted in social contexts (John-
son, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006; Ridgeway and Correll,
2006). As a collective construction of social reality, legitima-
tion has a cognitive dimension, whereby agents recognize a
social object as valid and taken for granted, and a normative-
prescriptive dimension that represents the social object as
right (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Pólos, Hannan, and Car-
roll, 2002).
Organizational research has echoed this formulation of legiti-
macy. Whether legitimacy is the result of sociopolitical
processes—what a society’s norms and institutional rules
endorse and prohibit (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Baum and
Oliver, 1992)—or the product of cognitive processes—a set
of schemas or beliefs agents collectively share (Carroll and
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Hannan, 2000; Hsu and Hannan, 2005)—institutional scholars
and organizational ecologists are converging on the idea that
legitimacy depends on the consensus among agents (audi-
ences) that the features and activities of organizations (candi-
dates) are appropriate and desirable within a widespread,
taken-for-granted system of norms or social codes (Zucker-
man, 1999; Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007), terms we use
synonymously to indicate cultural phenomena that prescribe
and proscribe behavior in specific circumstances (Hechter
and Opp, 2005). Although extant research has enhanced our
understanding of the processes that grant or withdraw legiti-
macy, the conditions fostering audience convergence toward
a common set of social codes, as well as the persistence of
such codes throughout the social domain, remain underex-
plored. Still relatively undeveloped is how “the structure and
dynamics of the audience .|.|. might affect consensus forma-
tion” (Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007: 302–303). If audi-
ences and candidates coevolve, the question is how the
process of legitimation is affected by the exchange structure
connecting candidate organizations to their social audiences.
It is the characteristics of this exchange structure that should
influence the likelihood of establishing consensus around
candidates’ accepted features and patterns of behavior,
hence affecting candidates’ survival rates.
Building on social network studies concerned with the trans-
mission and acceptance of knowledge, political agreement
(classic works include Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet,
1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954), and social
conformity (Sherif, 1936; Festinger, 1957; Thibaut and Kelley,
1959; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966), we suggest three
basic conditions under which consensus—agreement within
the audience on the candidates to accept or to exclude—is
reached, strengthened, and preserved: the degree of connec-
tivity of the network between audience members and candi-
date organizations, repeated interactions between audiences
and candidates, and the degree of turnover of audience
members. The first two conditions—connectivity and repeat-
ed interactions—are the result of mutual interactions
between the audience and candidates and account for the
creation of consensus among audience members about
which features and behaviors candidates must exhibit in
order to be accepted or excluded. While connectivity defines
the threshold of candidates’ acceptance by signaling their
inclusion as members, repeated interactions highlight candi-
dates’ exemplariness by signaling preferred audiences’ inter-
actions among accepted candidates. The third condition, audi-
ence turnover, is a structural feature of audiences that affects
the stability of consensus or the lack thereof.
We developed and tested hypotheses on audience consen-
sus and firm survival in the U.S. feature film industry from
1912 to the end of 1970, focusing on the ties between pro-
ducer and distributor organizations. Because they act as gate-
keepers for producers’ output to exhibitors and spectators
and access to relevant resources, distributors are members
of a crucial audience for producers, and producers are candi-
dates for that audience’s evaluation (Hannan, 2005). Although
other audiences play an important role in this setting (e.g.,
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movie critics, exhibitors, moviegoers), the central nature of
the relationship between producer and distributor organiza-
tions makes it especially useful for examining the audience-
candidate interface and the consensus that leads to
legitimation.
CONSENSUS AND LEGITIMATION
Legitimation has been recognized as a cornerstone of organi-
zational theories attempting to explain organizational action
(Scott, 1995). Organizational action is subject to social scruti-
ny by a variety of external agents, including other organiza-
tions, public authorities, intermediaries, and consumers.
These agents (or audiences) consider the features and activi-
ties of organizations (candidates) in relation to what they
expect organizations can or should do. Social codes originate
from this set of expectations, generating approval and advan-
tages when respected but also posing limits to action due to
implied sanctions if expectations are violated (Zuckerman,
1999).
Recent contributions in institutional and ecological research
have emphasized the role of social expectations and consen-
sus on those expectations in shaping legitimation and various
outcomes vital for individuals, organizations, and populations
(Zuckerman, 1999; Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Zuckerman et
al., 2003; Hsu and Hannan, 2005; Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll,
2007). Consensus is a critical stage in any social process of
evaluation. Similarly, the first step in the audience-candidate
process of evaluation is that audiences reach consensus to
validate organizational action (Zuckerman, 1999: 1406; but
see also DiMaggio, 1982; Rosa et al., 1999). Without this
consensus, determining the behaviors viewed as legitimate,
and therefore the organizations that will receive or be denied
legitimate standing, remains highly uncertain. By conferring
legitimacy on candidates, audiences act as autonomous gate-
keepers whose influence can determine the fate of products
or organizations (Hirsch, 1972). Organizations that successful-
ly pass audiences’ scrutiny can access material and symbolic
resources more easily, enhancing their life chances; those
that do not conform to audiences’ expectations experience
difficulty in maintaining the flows of environmental resources
(Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007). In his study of illegitimacy
costs in the stock market, Zuckerman (1999) demonstrated
that when American companies were not covered by the
securities analysts who specialized in the industries in which
they operated, their stock prices suffered discounts. Similarly,
Zuckerman and colleagues (2003) argued that the interaction
between employers and prospective employees can be
framed as an interface between a set of candidates who
compete with one another to be selected by an audience.
Employers screen candidates according to recognized cogni-
tive categories, and candidates “who succeed in associating
themselves with one such category enjoy greater success in
attracting employers’ attention” (p. 1021). On the contrary,
agents who defy prevailing socio-cognitive frames risk
engendering ambiguity among relevant audiences, thereby
producing penalties in the form of lack of attention or outright
rejection.
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Structural theory on social influence (e.g., Friedkin, 1998) and
studies on political disagreement (e.g., Huckfeldt, Johnson,
and Sprague, 2004) have elucidated the conditions that foster
the creation and stability of consensus. Both strands of
research stress the importance of examining structural char-
acteristics of the relationships that connect agents. These lit-
eratures typically focus on the structural characteristics of
networks among agents located in the same social position,
such as citizens voting for a new president, but they would
also apply to a network with two distinct organizational popu-
lations whose interaction can be framed in terms of an audi-
ence-candidate interface. Consensus on codes would depend
on three major characteristics of this network: connectivity
between the audience and the candidates, the number of
repeated interactions between the audience and the candi-
dates, and audience turnover, or instability. These conditions
describe distinct, though complementary mechanisms shap-
ing consensus formation and change.
Network Connectivity
Network-based models of social influence suggest that struc-
turally connected networks foster the formation and develop-
ment of consensus among network members (Harary, 1959;
Friedkin, 1998; Moody, 2004). Multiple features of connected
networks facilitate convergence toward consensus. First, net-
works comprising highly interconnected agents allow for
broader and timelier propagation of information (Owen-Smith
and Powell, 2004; Powell et al., 2004). Network members
exchange ideas, information, and implicit rules with their part-
ners. Interactions in more connected networks stimulate con-
vergence toward common schemas. This, in turn, results in
less uncertainty as information gaps are more easily filled
(Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). Also, because the scope for
information variation is narrower, the likelihood of being
exposed to unique information in more connected networks
is usually lower.
Second, higher levels of network connectivity signal member-
ship in a collective entity and reduce ambiguity about legiti-
mate organizational identities. A network refers not only to
social relations, to the links that connect specific individuals
directly or indirectly, but also to meanings and categories and
the attributes possessed by individuals (White, 1992; Moody
and White, 2003). Individuals make choices by observing the
fate of others who have faced similar choices and the pat-
terns and outcomes that emerge from relations among other
actors in the network (Leifer and White, 1987: 86). By signal-
ing membership, general connectivity fosters the emergence
of a more tightly linked and coherent community, i.e., a “cat-
net” (White, 1992), in which members share the same ties
and the same categories. The higher the level of connectivity
within a social domain, the more extensive are its common
identity and its ability to articulate a common interest.
Interconnected networks also provide multiple avenues by
which deviant behaviors are promptly identified (Gnyawali
and Madhavan, 2001). Robinson and Stuart (2007) suggested
that the aggregate network structure becomes a platform for
diffusing information about the transactional integrity of
148/ASQ, March 2008
exchange partners. By spreading information about agents’
behaviors, network connectivity facilitates the definition of
collective sanctions that “involve group members punishing
other members who violate group norms, values, or goals
and range from gossip and rumors to ostracism (exclusion
from the network for short periods or indefinitely) and sabo-
tage” (Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti, 1997: 931). Acheson’s
(1985) study of Maine lobster trapping illustrates how collec-
tive sanctions are enforced when agents in a connected net-
work break widely shared social norms: interlopers who vio-
late the accepted demarcation of fishing territories, for
example, are sanctioned through surreptitious destruction of
their traps.
Different considerations hold for fragmented networks in
which exchange activities tend to remain confined to self-
contained groups or sub-networks, thereby impeding wide-
spread information flows across the social domain. The pres-
ence of self-contained groups with relatively impermeable
communication networks engenders diversity in social
norms. Each group develops distinct sets of norms that dif-
ferentiate that group from other social groups. Thus candi-
dates typically encounter norms that are inconsistent, point-
ing them in different directions, and ambiguous in that
“expectations are incomplete or insufficient so that the
appropriate action is uncertain” (Friedkin, 1998: 13). Connec-
tivity increases the taken-for-granted character of a set of
norms. How agents perceive the natural way of collective
action forms the basis of constitutive legitimation (Carroll and
Hannan, 2000: 223) and enhances the ability of organizations
to access resources and fend off challenges. Higher connec-
tivity of the system should reduce ambiguity about organiza-
tional action and foster consensus on the rules that specify
what types of agents are allowed to exist, what actions are
conceivable, and what meanings are associated with these
actions (Ruef and Scott, 1998: 877). Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Increasing connectivity in the audience-candidate net-
work reduces candidates’ exit rates.
Repeated Interactions
Studies dealing with the social psychology of groups highlight
the importance of repeated interactions in the development
of norms (Sherif, 1936; Festinger, 1957). Interactions consist
of agents that exhibit behaviors in each other’s presence, cre-
ate products for each other, and communicate with each
other (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959: 10). A social norm exists only
in a category of recurrent situations and cannot be developed
through accidental or temporary interpersonal contacts. In
their study on dyadic relationships, Thibaut and Kelley (1959)
showed that a norm is a behavioral rule that is at least partial-
ly accepted by both members of the dyad or, in larger
groups, by a majority of members, and is the result of repeat-
ed interactions. Consensus is strengthened by a trial-and-
error process in which conformity to rules and agreements
that have proved rewarding in past interactions is preserved
in the future. The idea that consensus is reinforced through
repeated interaction is also prevalent in political communica-
tion studies. Sociologists have argued that when the frequen-
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cy of political communication among citizens increases, indi-
vidual political preferences are increasingly exposed to social
scrutiny (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Katz and
Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944;
McPhee, 1963). Previously idiosyncratic preferences become
socially visible, and individuals correspondingly conform to
their surroundings (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2004:
19).
Social situations constantly demand actions or opinions
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944). In their analysis of
the mechanisms and process through which a group devel-
ops common attitudes, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues high-
lighted how mutual interactions of group members are more
powerful than other mechanisms in explaining the formation,
change, and development of public opinion. As mutual inter-
actions take place, a new distribution of articulate opinions
and attitudes emerges or is reinforced. When no prior atti-
tudes exist, mutual interactions will form definite opinions;
when prior attitudes exist, mutual interactions will crystallize
them. The formation of opinions can be compared with the
kinds of problems with which economists have struggled for
many years. Economists have viewed prices stabilizing as a
consequence of the interaction between supply and the
demand of individuals. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet
(1944: xxiv) saw this dynamic as similar to the distribution of
opinion in a group: “In neither case can the final result be
explained by the previous actions or opinions of individuals
considered separately. In both cases the final result is a func-
tion of interactions which have as their by-product something
which had not existed before.”
Mutual interactions among organizations foster the emer-
gence and development of common attitudes and public
opinion. By engaging in mutual interactions, organizations are
likely to disclose some of the private information and experi-
ences that support common attitudes. The end result of such
interactions is reinforcement, a mutual strengthening of com-
mon attitudes (Granovetter, 1973; Larson, 1992). Also, organi-
zations that repeat collaborations may serve as reference
points for other agents who may evolve roles from observa-
tions of repeated behaviors (White, 2001). The extent to
which candidates are treated as preferred members of a pop-
ulation and their offerings as typical increases taken-for-grant-
edness and the associated organizational benefits (Hannan,
Pólos, and Carroll, 2007). Accordingly, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Increasing repeated interactions in the audience-can-
didate network reduces candidates’ exit rates.
Audience Turnover
Social organizations often exhibit continuity so that as mem-
bers leave and are replaced by other members, complex
organizations can still function as ongoing social units
(McNeil and Thompson, 1971: 624). Yet sociological studies
indicate that organizational continuity depends both on the
enduring commitment of old-timers, such as veterans in
organizations, long-time activists in social movements, or the
“old guard” in political parties, and on the inclusion of new-
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comers. At the same time, the emergence of new partici-
pants in the social process and the withdrawal of their prede-
cessors can threaten stability and provide the opportunity for
social transformations (Ryder, 1965). Generational processes
of recruitment and cohort turnover can thus produce change
in social organizations (White, 1970; McNeil and Thompson,
1971) and movements (Whittier, 1997).
Even if new entrants share basic assumptions and goals with
their predecessors, they often differ in important ways.
Unaware of specific routines and tacit knowledge, newcom-
ers’ ingenuity, improvisation, and diversity of experience
bring a fresh perspective to the organization or the group
(March, 1991; Jackson, Stone, and Alvarez, 1993). Though
slower turnover permits greater socialization of new mem-
bers by experienced ones and therefore leads to greater
organizational continuity, extensive recruitment can lead long-
tenured members to lose power, allowing new members to
gain influence within established organizations or groups
(Whittier, 1997).
Similar processes would be at work in the continuity or
preservation of consensus. Norms tend to persist once
established. They do not need to be reinvented when a new
relationship is formed and often can be transferred from
existing relationships. But new audience members need time
to learn established codes and may instead foster changes.
Especially when audience turnover is high, new members
have more difficulty in learning established norms and are
more likely to change them if they are less exposed to veter-
ans and the existing code. Until a new consensus is reached,
different norms will proliferate and vie for dominance. As
norms increase in number, they inevitably begin to overlap
and compete. Because norms often are inconsistent, decid-
ing which norms should receive precedence and which
should be applicable to specific cases becomes increasingly
difficult (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959: 140). As a result of higher
turnover levels, unique identities (White, 1992) and diverse
schools of thought (Price and de Solla, 1963) emerge, and
consensus around a shared set of social norms becomes
harder to achieve. As highlighted by Hannan, Pólos, and Car-
roll (2007: 54), “The ability of the members of an audience
segment to reach agreement .|.|. is potentially
problematic.|.|.|. For instance, [some members] could be in
open competition with others, and conflict and strategic
behavior .|.|. might preclude agreement.” Because shared
norms help to identify and sanction deviant behaviors, the
absence of consensus due to audience turnover not only
amplifies uncertainty about candidates’ appropriate behavior
but also lowers behavioral pressures to conform. Lack of con-
sensus and increased uncertainty reduce the satisfaction of
expectations, compound the problem of maintaining a steady
flow of resources from the environment, and thus hamper
organizational survival. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: Greater audience turnover in the audience-candidate
network increases candidates’ exit rates.
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Legitimacy, Social Codes, and Consensus in the American
Feature Film Industry
In his ethnographic account of Hollywood filmmaking, Pow-
dermaker (1950: 35) argued that just as every social system
operates under a number of institutionalized controls regulat-
ing economic and social life, so Hollywood has its specific
codes or taboos that “influence the methods of production,
the relationships between people, and leave their stamps on
the movies.” Movies and their producers are evaluated on
features that include details such as (1) “names”—i.e.,
stars; (2) “production value”—elaborate sets, big crowds,
and other indicators of great expense; (3) “story value”—the
price paid for the original story and its reputation as a novel
or play; (4) “picture sense”—the conglomeration of all these
items; and (5) “box office appeal”—the standardized values
that proved successful in years past (see Jacobs, 1939:
295–296).
The interaction between producer and distributor organiza-
tions lies at the center of this system of controls, and distrib-
utors are the ones who evaluate production methods and the
legitimacy of producer organizations. As one early economic
analysis noted, “.|.|. By virtue of the division of labor within
the business, film distributors are much more closely in
touch with the moviegoing public than are the producers, and
they trade heavily on their advantageous positions. From
their seat in the box office they announce that so-and-so is
‘poison at the box office’, that what the public wants is musi-
cals or blood-and-thunder westerns, that English stars murder
business, and that sophisticated farce comedies leave their
audiences completely cold” (Huettig, 1944: 230). Sixty years
later, distributors continue to “act as gatekeepers: they
decide which movies get produced and how they are made,
and they also largely determine when and at what price view-
ers get to see them on which media.|.|.|. Producers, direc-
tors, and other talent make their movies with varying degrees
of creative autonomy,” but mainly, distributors “maintain
overall control of the production process” (Waterman, 2005:
16-17).
Given the central role distributor organizations played within
the system, they represent a critical audience, and their rela-
tionships with producers have always influenced the content
and meaning of what producers do. The formulas for pictures
have been a series of constantly changing do’s and don’ts,
such as, “You cannot make an A picture about a prize fight,”
“No pictures with any kind of message do make money,”
“The love story must be the most important part of an A pic-
ture” (Powdermaker, 1950: 40). Departure from the codes
results in harmful consequences, like obstructed channels to
obtaining resources: “Violators of these taboos do not com-
mit suicide nor are they killed by members of their clan. But
they are refused its seal of approval, which is considered a
form of business suicide” (Powdermaker, 1950: 55). The
bankruptcy of Triangle Film Corporation is one of the most
famous examples of business suicide. Triangle Film Corpora-
tion was a major production company founded in 1915 by
Harry and Roy Aitken, based on the producing abilities of
filmmakers D. W. Griffith, Thomas Ince, and Mack Sennett.
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Aitken’s goal for Triangle was clear: to produce motion pic-
tures that articulated exclusive, highbrow cultural values and
yet to appeal to a broad, cross-class audience. Less than a
year after its birth, however, Triangle found itself on the brink
of financial ruin, having failed to attract audiences of any
class (King, 2005). Part of the reason was the epic fiasco of
Griffith’s grandiose Intolerance (1916), a colossal undertaking
filled with monumental sets, lavish period costumes, and
more than 3,000 extras. The movie was by far the most
expensive made at that point, and when it became a flop at
the box-office, the burden was so great that Triangle Studios
went bankrupt.
The production process of Intolerance presented unusual
characteristics that departed from established conventions
(Drew, 1986). First, an unorthodox editing was used to por-
tray an elaborately interwoven collection of four distinct but
parallel stories that covered 2,500 years during different ages
in world history. Critics and European film theorists praised
this technique, which became enormously influential, particu-
larly among Soviet filmmakers, but for the moviegoers, it was
difficult to follow the story. Second, none of the characters
had names because they had to be emblematic of human
types across history, but the moral and psychological connec-
tions among the different stories were too subtle for most of
the moviegoers, leaving them unengaged. Third, the majestic
buildings of the outdoor sets, which were the largest ever
built in motion pictures, were constructed in their entirety,
not just the parts that had to be filmed. This allowed more
freedom in filmmaking but increased the costs of the produc-
tion enormously. Actual costs to produce Intolerance are
unknown, but best estimates are close to $2 million, an
astronomical sum in 1916. When the movie failed, these
unusual characteristics became established taboos for pro-
ducers in the industry for the next 80 years. The movie Titan-
ic (1997) was the only other film for which an entire com-
plete set was built (Parisi, 1998: 134).
Just as primitive societies think “failure would result from
changing the form of a spell, so men in Hollywood consider it
dangerous to depart from their formulas. Each group can
point to the times it worked and conveniently forget or ratio-
nalize the other occasions” (Powdermaker, 1950: 285). When
distributors disagree about such formulas, like what consti-
tutes “names” or “production value,” or “story value,” pro-
ducers are less likely to receive resources for their produc-
tions. When, in 1914, D. W. Griffith proposed to produce a
picture dealing with the American Civil War, he was confront-
ed with immediate opposition. Some leaders of the industry,
who even in 1914 showed a tendency toward “creative stan-
dardization,” went so far as to try to block both the produc-
tion and the distribution of The Birth of a Nation. Griffith had
to seek his financial backing entirely among people outside
the industry. During the early and precarious life of the
motion picture industry, bankers were not attracted to this
business, partly because the business was new and
unknown but most of all because the customary standards of
credit rating could not be applied. In 1926, the banker A. P.
Giannini, a pioneer in the financing of motion picture produc-
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tion, opined that market value in film depended on “the pres-
ence of artists or producer organizations of recognized stand-
ing” (Wall Street Journal, 1926: 3). When value was in doubt,
the judgment of a half-dozen distribution exchange or theater
managers allowed one to obtain an immediate rating. The
acceptance or rejection evaluations by audience members,
therefore, critically influenced what resources would be avail-
able for filmmaking.
Information is necessary to navigate the film industry.
Although a great deal of information is available on the status
of ongoing projects or the performance of completed pro-
jects, such information requires decoding and has varying
degrees of reliability. The wisdom of the “movie colony” is
conveyed not through formal blueprints but through the use
of deep symbolism, relationships, and constant interactions.
Formulas and taboos are the result of knowledge and tradi-
tions based on instinct: “The movie makers work with hunch-
es, not logic; they trade in impressions rather than analyses.
It is natural that they court the intuitive and shun the system-
atic, for they are expert in the one and untutored in the
other” (Rosten, 1948: 48). Other fields similarly fail to articu-
late fully the bases of their valuations. In the art world, Beck-
er (1982: 199) observed, “.|.|. artists find it difficult to verbal-
ize the general principles on which they make their choices.
They often resort to such non-communicative statements as
‘it sounds better that way,’ ‘it looked good to me,’ or ‘it
works.’”
In such a context, more connected networks between pro-
ducer and distributor organizations provide several advan-
tages. First, producer organizations are less likely to require
justification for their work but are also less likely to invest in
unconventional formulas for which there are few current
resources available, as in experiments in color pictures prior
to the 1950s (Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson, 1985). Sec-
ond, they have access to more consistent information about
production trends, and if they inadvertently target popular
and oversaturated film genres, such as westerns in the
1920s, they could find themselves in a weaker position to
obtain resources (Lewis, 1933). Similarly, repeated interac-
tions between production and distribution organizations can
generate various advantages not offered by networks with
episodic interactions. For example, they can allow producer
organizations to calibrate styles and features that distributors
have noted are likely to receive limited critical and public
acceptance, as happened with non-narrative films. In serial
productions, this calibration fine-tunes new elements while
holding the others constant.
The influence of social codes is also affected by turnover in
the industry network. Replacement of personnel and organi-
zations, including distributors, is an important characteristic of
the film industry. As Rosten (1948: 37) noted, “As a profes-
sional community which is itself young, and whose popula-
tion is weighted toward youth composition, the movie busi-
ness moves with relentless speed.” Hollywood’s traditionally
young profile makes it “not surprising then that the movie
colony has not achieved stability or integration.” And Pow-
dermaker (1950: 39–40) explained that Hollywood has “deep
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roots in the past, which dominates the present; but there are
also new tendencies, some of which may be merely aberra-
tions—and others, signposts to the future.|.|.|. Each one of
the formulas has been successfully broken and shown to be
false at one time or another. But each time anyone departs
from the formula and meets with success, the departure
then becomes another formula.”
METHOD
Data
We analyzed an original database that includes all motion pic-
ture producer organizations in the United States. The obser-
vation period begins in 1912, the year of release of the first
American-produced feature film, and ends in 1970, the last
year covered by the primary data source. Although the first
public screening of motion pictures in the United States
dates to 1895, it was not until 1912 that production compa-
nies started making and showing multiple-reel feature films.
Feature-length films, usually defined as longer than four reels
(each reel runs 1,000 feet, or about 10 minutes), altered the
organization of all activities within the industry. Not only were
feature films longer, but they also were more complex to
make and market, requiring higher levels of capital invest-
ment and differentiated marketing efforts (Bordwell, Staiger,
and Thompson, 1985).
We reconstructed the life histories of producing organizations
through the release dates of their films. Producer organiza-
tions enter the population with the release of their first film
and exit it the first day following the release date of their last
film (see also Mezias and Mezias, 2000). We examined all
films produced in the United States during the study period
and reconstructed the evolution of the network by linking the
producer and distributor organizations. As with other corpo-
rate demography studies using product-level information,
these data do not account for the duration of pre-production
processes (Carroll and Hannan, 2000), but the short period of
time necessary to produce a film—on average, production
companies complete a film in six to eighteen months—limits
the importance of pre-production periods.
The American Film Institute (AFI) Catalog of Motion Pictures
Produced in the United States: Feature Films, 1911–1970
(1989–1999, Berkeley: University of California Press) serves
as the primary data source. This directory comprises reviews
of all motion pictures distributed in the U.S. between 1893
and 1970 and provides detailed information on each film. In
addition to this primary source, we also collected industry-
level statistics and supplemental information from two ency-
clopedic publications, The Motion Picture Year Book and the
Motion Picture Almanac. Although experts generally consider
the AFI catalog the most complete and comprehensive
source on the film industry (Mezias and Mezias, 2000), it has
one shortcoming: it lists feature films released in the periods
1911–1950 and 1960–1970 but only partially documents the
period from 1951 to 1960. To fill this missing window, we
consulted additional sources: (1) A. G. Fetrow’s (1999) filmog-
raphy, covering film production in the U.S. in the 1950s; (2)
the Motion Picture Catalog of the Library of Congress, which
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provides a list of all films that received copyright protection
from 1950 to 1959, along with their respective production
and distribution companies; and (3) The Motion Picture Guide
1927–1982, a reference set edited by J. R. Nash and S. R.
Ross (1985–1986; New York: Cinebooks) that provides com-
parable information. We restricted the population of producer
organizations in several ways. We excluded films produced
and released for non-commercial purposes, such as those
commissioned by government agencies. We also excluded
imported films, as these come from non-U.S. based produc-
tion companies. In cases of international co-production, we
included films in which an American producer organization
appeared as the first stakeholder.1 Finally, we excluded films
from the late 1960s that provided no information on genre.
Variables
Analyzing failure, or exit rates, is a typical strategy to test
ecological theories. Accordingly, our dependent variable is
exit rates of feature film producer organizations from the
market. Organizations can exit in many different ways, includ-
ing disbanding, bankruptcy, merger, or acquisition. For this
study, we could only identify mergers that resulted in a
merged entity that produced a film following the merger.
When a dominant partner existed, we treated it as having
survived and the subordinate partner as having exited. As we
could not distinguish between other modes of exit, we did
not attempt to analyze transition rates for these different
types of events separately. The network in this setting is rep-
resented by two vertically related sets: producer organiza-
tions selling their product (feature films) and distributor orga-
nizations. The analysis considers the population of producer
organizations as candidates and distributor organizations as
audience members interacting with candidates. To gauge the
structural dynamics of the network connecting audiences and
candidates, we modeled it as a valued bipartite undirected
network (Asratian, Denley, and Haggkvist, 1998). In this net-
work, each film title represents an attachment between the
two sets (i.e., producer organizations supplying a film to a
distributor). Thus we assumed these attachments to be
homogeneous for a producer organization i and distributor j,
with aij,t denoting the number of films produced by producer
organization i for distributor j at time t.
In defining a tie, we had to make an assumption about the
duration of the relationship between producer and distributor
organizations. With no control for relationship decay, network
connectedness of the domain would be highly inflated due to
the inclusion of ties to inactive agents. Following a common
practice in network studies, we used a moving window to
control for the duration of each tie, hence making the adja-
cency matrixes time-varying (e.g., Podolny, Stuart, and Han-
nan, 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). In the analysis, we
used a three-year moving window: if one organization did not
appear in the industry for three years, that organization and
its ties were removed from the network in the fourth year,
but we integrated that organization and its links back into the
network if it reentered the industry the following year (see
also Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). Thus the adjacency matrix for a
given year traces collaborations formed in that year and in
1
In supplemental analyses, we added con-
trols for the cases of co-production, co-
distribution, and cooperative distribution
but found no significant effects or impact
on the results we present. We also exam-
ined cases of producer organizations
releasing their films through regional dis-
tribution channels and found that regional
sub-distribution increased producer com-
panies’ exit rates, perhaps because in the
absence of national distributors who
invest in advertising and promotion, the
organizations that managed the release
tended to be less efficient. Still, the find-
ings we present were unaffected. Results
for these additional analyses are available
from the authors upon request.
156/ASQ, March 2008
any of the previous three years. We also employed alterna-
tive windows of two, four, and five years but found no signifi-
cant differences from the results we report. Following this
codification procedure, we created valued yearly biadjacency
matrices in which edges connect vertices from different sets
of organizations and there are no ties within any set (Borgatti
and Everett, 1997; Asratian, Denley, and Haggkvist, 1998).
The cells of these matrices are valued because any producer
organization could supply more than one film to the same
distributor in a given year (the element ij and the symmetric ji
may assume values greater than 1) and because we tracked
distributed movies by any pair of organizations (producer and
distributor) over a three-year window. We used the biadjacen-
cy matrices to compute all actor- and aggregate-level network
measures.
Our first explanatory variable is connectivity. The most
straightforward indicator of network connectivity is the recip-
rocal of the count of the number of components, i.e., the
maximal connected sub-graphs into which the network is dis-
aggregated (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This components-
based connectivity measure reaches a maximum when the
number of components is equal to 1, that is, all nodes of the
network are connected. Conversely, connectivity is minimal
when every node is an isolate, and there are as many compo-
nents as there are nodes. The limitation with this approach is
that it does not take into account the size of the components
(see Borgatti, 2006). This is illustrated in the producers-dis-
tributors network depicted in figure 1, in which circles repre-
sent producer organizations and triangles represent distribu-
tors. The network at time t consists of a single component
and is therefore fully connected. Now compare the two alter-
native cases at time t+1. In the first case, node 6 exits the
network; in the second case, it is node 8 that leaves the net-
work at time t+1. Both exits fragment the network into two
components, resulting in a drop in components-based con-
nectivity from 1 to 0.5, yet, in the first case, more pairs of
nodes will be separated from each other.
This suggests an alternative approach to measuring connec-
tivity that accounts for components’ size. The approach we
chose builds on Krackhardt’s (1994) measure of connected-
ness, which simply counts the number of pairs of nodes that
are connected to one another. Given a matrix R in which rij =
1 if i can reach j and 0 otherwise, the measure of connectivi-
ty can be defined as follows:
2
i

j<i
rij /n(n–1)
Krackhardt’s score provides the proportion of mutually reach-
able pairs over the total number of reachable pairs in a fully
connected network. It therefore ranges from 0 to 1, with 0
equal to no connectivity in the network, and 1 equal to maxi-
mum connectivity. When applied to the previous example,
this measure returns a value of 0.44 for network A and 0.61
for network B, thus providing a more accurate representation
of the difference in connectivity between the two structures.
Another benefit of using this measure is that it does not
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depend deterministically on either population density or the
number of films released in any given year. In fact, unlike the
standard density measure (percentage of all possible ties pre-
sent in the network), which always decreases with the num-
ber of nodes in the domain, the connectivity measure can
change freely, because the number of mutually reachable
pairs depends only on the topology of the network and the
rules of attachment that underpin it. For instance, new
entrants into the population might connect across previously
separate components and enhance the connectivity of the
entire domain or choose to link to minor components or oper-
ate in isolation from the rest of the population, thus dampen-
ing the overall level of connectivity. For the same reason, the
release of new films does not necessarily add to the inter-
connectivity of the field so long as the corresponding
exchanges between producer and distributor organizations do
not span previously unconnected components of the net-
work. Theoretically, the connectivity measure reflects a sim-
ple yet essential enabling structural condition for achieving
consensus among the members of a community, i.e., the
existence of a relational pathway connecting as many mem-
bers as possible. This intuition was captured well by
Markovsky and Lawler (1994) when they identified “reacha-
bility” as an essential feature of cohesion and is consistent
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Figure 1. An illustration of network connectivity.
with our approach, which rests on the reachability between a
node and any other node in the network, either directly adja-
cent or via a walk. Empirically, it has the notable advantage of
making network size irrelevant, whereas any approach based
on volume (or density) of relations necessarily limits the abili-
ty to explore structural connectivity in large social settings
because the investments required to increase density rise
exponentially with the number of agents (Moody and White,
2003).
Our second independent variable is the mean level of repeat-
ed ties at the population level. Repeated ties occur when a
producer organization repeats its exchange of a film with a
distributor organization. We calculated a measure of repeated
ties for each producer organization in each year by counting
the average number of times the organization worked with a
distributor in the three-year window. We then summed these
values and divided them by the total number of connected
pairs in the network. The independent variable used in the
analysis measures the log of the average number of times
producer organizations repeated collaborations with the same
distributors during the window period.
Our third independent variable is audience turnover. We mea-
sured the heterogeneity of audience members by analyzing
the tenure distribution and included the standard deviation of
distributor tenure as the measure of heterogeneity. Research
in organizational demography often measures turnover by
using the coefficient of variation; however, recent method-
ological work recommends estimating heterogeneity in the
tenure distribution using a measure of variation, like the stan-
dard deviation, while controlling for the effect of mean tenure
(Sørensen, 2002). The use of a single measure like the coeffi-
cient of variation may confound the effect that the two dis-
tinct characteristics of demographic distributions can have on
turnover and other organizational outcomes. Therefore, when
we estimated the effect of tenure heterogeneity, we includ-
ed a variable that measures the mean organizational tenure
of distributor organizations. In alternative measurements, we
calculated turnover as (1) the share of exits of distributor
organizations, calculated as the ratio of the number of distrib-
utor exits in the prior year divided by the number of distribu-
tor organizations (oldtimer ratio) and (2) the percentage of
new distributor organizations that enter each year (newcomer
ratio). We expected the two alternative measurements would
continue to show a positive effect on exit rates. We present
estimations using these alternative measures as robustness
tests in the results section.
Controls
Our analysis included several control variables. To account for
age dependence, we estimated a piecewise exponential
specification, which we describe in greater detail below. By
including time-varying information on organizational size, we
could isolate the effects of age from size. Research on time-
varying size and life chances conceptualizes organizational
size in two ways: capacity and scale of operations. Our mea-
sure here—the logged annual volume of film production (i.e.,
a count of films released in the previous 12 months)—focus-
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es on scale. Organizations involved in more projects survived
longer because of their ability to diversify some of the
project-specific uncertainty plaguing each individual film.
An analysis of interdependence between populations raises
the issue of how to treat boundary-spanning organizations,
namely, film producer organizations that are vertically inte-
grated in distribution. The modeling of the network of rela-
tionships between producer and distributor organizations
implies ignoring transactions that producers manage them-
selves, a decision that could have influenced our theoretical
predictions and empirical strategy. We addressed this prob-
lematic issue in two ways: (1) by introducing a time-varying
dichotomous measure of vertical integration, taking a value of
1 if the production company also distributed at least one of
its films in that year and 0 otherwise, and (2) by estimating
models only for the subset of non-integrated production com-
panies. To account for the network size of the focal organiza-
tion, we added a measure of the log of the number of net-
work partners with which each producer organization
engages in exchange every year. This variable increases
whenever the focal production company adds new ties to its
network. New ties in a firm’s network broaden the scope of
the firm, thereby increasing the likelihood of obtaining new
information and adding to the diversity of information to
which a firm is exposed (Baum and Ingram, 1998; Beckman,
Haunschild, and Phillips, 2004).2 Another network control at
the firm level is the membership in the main component, i.e.,
connection to the largest weakly connected network sub-
graph. Firms that are part of the main component are more
likely to face converging expectations from their audiences
and to tap into rich information spillovers. As suggested by
Owen-Smith and Powell (2004), membership in the main
component offers a channel to the widest range of informa-
tion flows while increasing a firm’s visibility in labor markets
and in informal networks.
Additional controls include repeated ties measured at the
dyadic level in two ways. First, we calculated repeated ties
between each producer organization and distributor organiza-
tion in any given year as the logged average number of times
that an organization repeated collaboration with the same dis-
tributors during the observation window. As organizations
repeat their collaborations, several advantages develop that
have a positive impact on survival, including mutual trust
(Granovetter, 1973), norms of reciprocity (Larson, 1992), and
joint problem solving arrangements (Uzzi, 1996). Moreover,
reduced exit rates may result from buyers offering better
terms of trade and allocating more resources to transactions
embedded within existing suppliers, thereby contributing to
the advantages of such exchange patterns. Sorenson and
Waguespack (2006) showed that motion picture distributor
organizations exhibit a preference for carrying films involving
key personnel with whom they have had prior exchange rela-
tions and that they tend to favor these films in the allocation
of resources like opening dates and marketing investments.
To control for such dynamics, we measured repeated ties
between individual producers and distributor organizations.
This control also helps us account for the fact that a non-
2
A frequently used proxy for information
diversity is Burt’s (1992) structural holes
measure, which captures the extent to
which an actor’s contacts are themselves
connected to one another. This measure
is less appropriate here, as the bipartite
nature of the network implies a restriction
on the mixing, such that ties only cross
classes. By implication, in this network,
no connection between the ego’s alters
can ever occur.
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trivial number of production companies are one-off ventures,
coming into existence only for the realization of one or a few
movies. This intrinsic feature of the industry would suggest
that the appropriate level of analysis is individual networks
rather than organizational ones. The measure at the individual
level mitigates this concern. It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that it was not until the late 1950s that short-term pro-
jects and individual networks became pervasive features of
the American film industry (Faulkner and Anderson, 1987; De
Vany, 2004). This potential source of bias is therefore proba-
bly more relevant in subsequent years than in the period cov-
ered by our study. Finally, to control for survival-related
effects of niche width (Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan, 2001), we
analyzed film production across genre segments and included
a measure of the log of the number of film genres in which
each producer organization operates every year. Finally, when
we tested for the effect of audience turnover, we also includ-
ed a variable measuring the mean size of distributor organiza-
tions. We calculated this variable as the average number of
films released by distributors to separate size-dependent
effects in the audience, such as the exercise of market
power in buyer-supplier relationships, from the hypothesized
impact of audience turnover. We also introduced several
aggregate-level variables to control for changes in carrying
capacity and industry structure. The first of these controls is
population density. We measured density by counting the
number of film producer organizations operating each year.
Based on the knowledge that production in the motion pic-
ture industry requires an average of 12 months of pre-entry
activity, we updated density and other covariates annually
using 12-month moving averages. Following other recent
studies (Ruef, 2004; Lomi, Larsen, and Freeman, 2005), we
used moving averages to adjust for inertia in the rate at
which firms respond to changes in population density and
environmental characteristics. The use of moving averages
accounts for the fact that organizational vital rates do not
reflect events that occurred precisely 12 months earlier and
also reduces the effect of measurement error in our record-
ing of the timing of events. Because exit rates are influenced
by the effects of population density at the time of founding
and the resulting liability of resource scarcity (Carroll and Han-
nan, 1989), we included density delay as an additional con-
trol. To capture community-level effects, we included a vari-
able measuring the density of distributor organizations.
Finally, because connectivity may capture industry size
effects rather than network structure, we included a variable
measuring industry mass (Barnett, 1997), calculated as the
total number of films made each year.
Over the period studied, motion pictures went from being
the primary form of visual entertainment (1912–1946) to
being an alternative to other media, particularly television
(1947–1970). We therefore entered weekly attendance in
terms of millions of admissions per year to measure carrying
capacity in the models.3 In addition, we included television
penetration to address potential symbiotic or competitive
relationships between film and television. We introduced a
measure of market concentration to control for potential bar-
riers to entry and resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985; Mezias
3
Data on film attendance are incomplete
before 1918. Since the introduction of a
war tax on movie consumption, however,
attendance has been systematically
reported. Some sources provide informa-
tion for earlier years, e.g., Donahue (1987)
for 1911, which we used to interpolate
the missing data. The findings presented
in the paper were analogous when we
use number of theaters, which also con-
tained interpolations. We employed alter-
native variables that can be used to mea-
sure carrying capacity. For example, we
collected data on annual recreational
expenditures (i.e., money spent in recre-
ational activities) in the U.S. over the
study period from the Historical Statistics
of the United States, Colonial Times to
1970, Bicentennial Edition (Bureau of the
Census, 2003). The main findings we
report hold across these measurements,
and the alternative variables did not pro-
vide better-fitting specifications.
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and Mezias, 2000). We utilized a Hirschman-Herfindahl index,
obtained by squaring and then summing the market share of
each production company based on the number of films pro-
duced. We included two dichotomous variables to control for
period effects. One variable addresses the potential effects
associated with the establishment of the Hollywood Studio-
system period (RKO, the youngest of the “majors,” began
producing films in 1928); our measure takes a value of 1
between 1928 and 1947 and 0 otherwise. Historical analyses
of the industry suggest that total integration might have
reduced the viability of smaller or more specialized producers
because the majors controlled access to a significant propor-
tion of first-run theaters (Conant, 1960; Balio, 1985). The
other variable (post-Paramount period) addresses the poten-
tial impact of antitrust actions on the structure of the indus-
try. In 1948, a government suit against the eight largest firms
(United States vs. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131) culmi-
nated in a Supreme Court decision that imposed divestiture
of the exhibition chains owned by the majors. Observers sub-
sequently have argued that production activities have
become more and more organized around short-term, decen-
tralized projects (Balio, 1985; Caves, 2000). The variable
takes the value of 1 from 1948 to 1970 and 0 otherwise.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and the correlation
matrix for the variables used in the regressions.
Model
We modeled the exit of producer organizations using r(t), the
instantaneous risk of exiting. This hazard rate is defined as
the limiting probability of exiting between t and t + ∆t, given
that the organization was operating at t, calculated over ∆t:
µ(t) = lim∆t→0 Pr(t < T  t + ∆t  T > t) / ∆t
Parametric estimates of the hazard rate require assumptions
about the effect of time (in these models, age) on failure. We
adopted the piecewise exponential specification, which
allows the base rate of exit to vary flexibly with organizational
age. This approach splits time into pieces according to the
tenure of the organization. The base failure rate remains con-
stant within each time piece, though these base rates can
vary across pieces. As a result, the piecewise model does
not require any strong assumption about the exact form of
duration dependence (for more information on this approach,
see Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994). Our exploratory
research on the population found the best fit using five break
points, at 1, 2, 4, 10, and 20 years (intervals open on the
right). The first segment includes events occurring within the
first year of tenure in the industry and cases that enter and
exit within the same year. The second segment includes
events that occur within the first and second years of tenure,
and so forth. The form of the model is
r(t) = eXel if t ∈ Il,
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where X is the vector of covariates,  is the associated vec-
tor of coefficients, and l is the constant coefficient associat-
ed with the lth age period. Life histories of each production
company were broken into one-year spells to incorporate
time-varying covariates. The reported results are maximum-
likelihood estimates.
RESULTS
Tables 2–4 report the results from the regression analysis. In
addition to likelihood ratio tests used to compare nested
models, the tables refer to Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
as a likelihood-based measure of overall model fit to compare
competing, including non-nested, models. The conventional
interpretation of AIC is as an estimate of the loss of precision
(increase in information) that results when θx, the maximum
likelihood estimate, is substituted for the true parametric
value, θt, in the likelihood function. Thus, by selecting the
model with minimum AIC, the estimated loss of precision is
minimized. Smaller values of AIC indicate better fitting
models.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variable Mean S.D. .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Organizational tenure 3.94 7.15
01. Organizational size .39 .85
02. Vertical integration .13 .34 .54
03. Number of network partners .13 .85 .24 –.01
04. Repeated ties prod. org.–distrib org. .38 .71 .45 .03 .20
05. Repeated ties ind. prod.–distrib org. .68 3.78 .40 .21 –.02 .20
06. Niche width .69 .97 .17 .13 .05 .16 .21
07. Membership in main component .23 .42 .08 –.07 .16 .13 –.04 .02
08. Density of producer orgs. 178 64.06 –.17 –.07 .03 –.10 –.20 –.72 –.06
09. Density of producer orgs.2  10–2 357 243.05 –.17 –.07 .02 –.12 –.19 –.69 –.08 .98
10. Density delay 179 62.83 –.14 –.07 –.04 –.15 –.12 –.54 –.10 .80 .80
11. Density of distributor orgs. 66 33.77 –.12 –.03 .03 –.10 –.14 .02 –.10 .77 .81
12. Mass 2.59 .24 .14 .06 .10 .16 .05 .44 .07 –.06 –.11
13. Weekly theater attendance 45.23 22.60 .17 .11 –.01 .13 .28 .72 .00 –.66 –.65
14. Television penetration 34.20 40.76 –.23 –.12 –.07 –.19 –.12 –.07 –.10 .59 .61
15. Market concentration 3.76 2.75 .12 .06 –.05 .07 .03 –.02 .04 –.65 –.58
16. Studio-system period .22 .42 .11 .10 –.03 .04 .27 –.02 –.08 –.46 –.52
17. Post-Paramount period .47 .50 –.23 –.13 –.09 –.18 –.08 –.09 –.05 .51 .51
18. Connectivity .40 .18 .01 –.03 .04 .03 –.09 –.14 .17 –.26 –.33
19. Mean repeated ties 1.06 .63 .09 .05 .10 .14 .03 .31 .06 –.17 –.20
20. Mean audience size 7.43 4.19 –.09 –.07 –.11 –.05 .16 –.17 .00 –.20 –.21
21. Mean audience tenure 6.73 3.94 .17 .04 .01 .14 .19 .60 .11 –.62 –.62
22. Audience turnover 9.13 4.82 –.19 –.11 –.13 –.14 .09 –.49 –.06 .15 .14
Variable .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15 .16 .17 .18 .19 .20 .21
11. Density of distributor orgs. .74
12. Mass –.03 –.03
13. Weekly theater attendance –.58 –.53 .33
14. Television penetration .56 .50 –.48 –.67
15. Market concentration –.59 –.54 .40 .57 –.53
16. Studio-system period –.38 –.29 .18 .70 –.35 .44
17. Post-Paramount period .37 .33 –.49 –.54 .78 –.40 –.50
18. Connectivity –.29 –.43 –.08 –.14 –.14 .16 –.44 .06
19. Mean repeated ties –.17 –.25 .49 .26 –.38 .01 .09 –.32 .15
20. Mean audience size –.23 –.42 .32 .24 .21 .07 .10 .49 .15 –.02
21. Mean audience tenure –.52 –.56 –.23 .59 –.57 .20 .31 –.33 .15 .17 .24
22. Audience turnover .07 –.05 –.40 –.14 .53 –.07 –.08 .70 –.02 –.20 .77 –.06
Model 1 in table 2 presents a baseline specification that
includes only the controls. The baseline shows that film pro-
ducer organizations experience decreasing exit rates over
their tenure. This result supports the idea that new organiza-
tions have more difficulty in being accepted in the audience-
candidate network. Yet the extremely high exit rate associat-
ed with the first year may stem from a specific feature of the
movie industry: individuals frequently organize to produce a
single motion picture and then disband. Alternatively, this lia-
bility may reflect the risky nature of movie-making, whereby
the vast majority of products fail to attract sufficient moviego-
ers to cover costs. With respect to scale, increasing size
appears to reduce market risks effectively, and all models
reveal negative size-dependence. In separate analyses, we
included relative size in place of or in addition to absolute size
and obtained equivalent results. Given that previous analyses
of the industry did not typically find substantial cost savings
associated with simultaneously producing multiple movies,
these effects likely stem from risk diversification rather than
economies of scale. Market concentration does not signifi-
cantly influence exit in any of the models; hence, cost advan-
tages do not appear to push smaller production companies
out of the market. We separately analyzed the historical evo-
lution of concentration in production and found that it does
not interact with time trends, again in opposition to resource
partitioning logic. Integration seems to insulate producers
from resource dependence on distributors (Negro and Soren-
son, 2006). Spanning across genres increases exit rates, sug-
gesting that the ability of the external audiences to perceive
and identify an organization’s fit with established market posi-
tions decreases with niche width (Hsu, 2006).
Among the period effects, the studio-system indicator
exhibits a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that
performance of production companies actually improved dur-
ing the years of dominance by the Hollywood majors. The
post-Paramount variable shows a positive and weakly (p <
.10) significant coefficient, reflecting a riskier environment.
Television penetration produces a positive and weakly signifi-
cant effect on exit rates, suggesting the existence of compe-
tition between media. As illustrated by model 1, film produc-
er organizations are affected by density-dependent U-shaped
dynamics, with density first reducing and then increasing exit
rates. Density delay has the predicted positive and significant
effect, while distributor density shows a negative and signifi-
cant effect on the production companies’ exit rates, suggest-
ing the presence of symbiosis provided by complementary
differences between audience members and candidate orga-
nizations (Audia, Freeman, and Reynolds, 2006). Mass has a
positive effect on exit, indicating that increasing aggregate
size generates more intense competition and consequently
lowers survival. At the dyadic level, we find that repeated
ties have a negative effect on exit rates. The effect is signifi-
cant for both the producer-organization and the individual-
producer dyads with the distributor organization. Although
film production can have a transient nature, our observation
of distinct effects by individual producer and organizational
networks suggests that the latter is the appropriate level for
our analysis of exit rates. Finally, network size has a positive
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Table 2
Piecewise Exponential Regression Models of Exit Rates of Feature Film Producer Organizations*
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Tenure 0 ≤ u = 1 0.627•• 1.011••• 0.025 0.882••• 0.390
(0.250) (0.263) (0.316) (0.273) (0.329)
Tenure 1 ≤ u = 2 –1.433••• –1.050••• –2.042••• –1.179••• –1.679•••
(0.257) (0.269) (0.323) (0.280) (0.336)
Tenure 2 ≤ u = 4 –1.495••• –1.100••• –2.109••• –1.225••• –1.723•••
(0.256) (0.269) (0.323) (0.279) (0.336)
Tenure 4 ≤ u = 10 –1.861••• –1.476••• –2.470••• –1.602••• –2.101•••
(0.258) (0.271) (0.324) (0.283) (0.338)
Tenure 10 ≤ u = 20 –2.079••• –1.680••• –2.686••• –1.819••• –2.302•••
(0.276) (0.288) (0.338) (0.297) (0.350)
Tenure > 20 –2.595••• –2.212••• –3.199••• –2.355••• –2.852•••
(0.341) (0.351) (0.393) (0.357) (0.403)
Organizational size –0.908••• –0.904••• –0.917••• –0.904••• –0.911•••
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051)
Vertical integration –0.515••• –0.512••• –0.513••• –0.512••• –0.507•••
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Number of network partners –0.180••• –0.185••• –0.168•• –0.203••• –0.191•••
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Repeated ties producer org.– –0.156••• –0.162••• –0.147••• –0.166••• –0.161•••
—distributor org. (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Repeated ties individual producer– –0.030•• –0.027••• –0.030•• –0.023• –0.022•
—distributor org. (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Niche width 0.843••• 0.607••• 0.976••• 0.570••• 0.416•••
(0.098) (0.104) (0.108) (0.126) (0.144)
Membership in main component –0.206••• –0.189••• –0.201••• –0.187••• –0.181•••
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Density of producer organizations –0.019••• –0.017••• –0.016••• –0.020••• –0.015•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Density of producer organizations2 0.006••• 0.006••• 0.006••• 0.007••• 0.006•••
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Density delay 0.003••• 0.003••• 0.003••• 0.003••• 0.003•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Density of distributor organizations –0.009••• –0.013••• –0.011••• –0.015••• –0.019•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mass 0.075• 0.082• 0.096•• 0.112•• 0.118••
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047)
Weekly theater attendance –0.001 –0.006•• –0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Television penetration 0.004• 0.001 0.004•• 0.006• –0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Market concentration –0.031 0.041 0.018 –0.135 0.083
(0.134) (0.136) (0.135) (0.142) (0.148)
Studio-system period –0.436•• –0.536••• –0.439••• –0.305•• –0.329••
(0.128) (0.122) (0.128) (0.130) (0.134)
Post-Paramount period 0.181• 0.192• 0.199•• 0.186 0.334•••
(0.101) (0.098) (0.100) (0.142) (0.144)
Connectivity –0.475••• –0.277•••
(0.075) (0.084)
Mean repeated ties –0.040••• –0.040•••
(0.013) (0.013)
Mean audience size 0.032•• 0.039•••
(0.012) (0.010)
Mean audience tenure –0.225••• –0.188•••
(0.026) (0.027)
Audience turnover 0.193••• 0.130•••
(0.034) (0.037)
Log-likelihood –16248.28 –16228.569 –16243.553 –16207.889 –16193.427
Chi-square vs. null 6930.34••• 7004.93••• 6939.03••• 7060.86••• 7104.92•••
Chi-square vs. model 1 39.42••• 9.45••• 80.78••• 109.706•••
Chi-square vs. model 2 70.284•••
Chi-square vs. model 3 100.252•••
Chi-square vs. model 4 28.924•••
AIC 32542.56 32505.14 32535.11 32467.78 32442.85
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 9,316 firm/year spells.
influence on survival: numerous exchange partners improve
production companies’ market power and minimize the risk
of uncertain exchanges. Membership in the main component
shows a negative effect, hinting at the benefits of being part
of the larger element of the network. We performed a likeli-
hood ratio (LR) test between the specification in model 1 and
a reduced specification with only ecological variables, omit-
ting number of exchange partners, repeated ties between
distributor and producer organizations, repeated ties between
distributor organizations and individual producers, and mem-
bership in the main component. The test reveals that the
model that contains network variables explains producer exit
rates much better that the simple ecological model (2[L1 –
Lreduced] = 60.7, p < .001 for 4 d.f.). The AIC values (32542.6
vs. 32595.3) indicate the same tendency.
Model 2 adds the first network measure, connectivity: As
expected, the effect on exit rates is negative and statistically
significant. At its mean value, network connectivity reduces
producer exits by about 38.9 percent. As indicated by the LR
test (2[L2 – L1] = 39.4, p < .001 for 1 d.f.) and the AIC, this
specification improves over the baseline model. We thus find
support for hypothesis 1, that increasing reachability decreas-
es the exit of producer organizations. Figure 2 presents the
graphical representation of the effect of network connectivity
on the multiplier of the exit rate.
Model 3 includes the second network measure, mean
repeated ties. As predicted, the variable has a negative and
significant effect on producers’ exit. A one-standard-deviation
increase in repeated interactions reduces producer exits by
about 2.5 percent. Net of the influence of repeated ties at
the dyadic level, the effect of mean repeated ties is signifi-
cant. In unreported estimations, we replaced the mean repe-
tition variable with the median and continued to find a nega-
tive and significant effect. The specification of model 3 has a
better fit than the baseline (2[L3 – L1] = 9.5, p < .001 for 1
d.f., and AIC is 32535.1) and supports hypothesis 2, that
increasing repeated interactions between audience members
and candidates reduce the latter’s exit. Figure 3 depicts the
effect of mean repeated ties on the multiplier of the exit rate.
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Figure 2. Effect of network connectivity on the multiplier of the exit
rate. 
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Model 4 tests hypothesis 3 by including the third network
measure, audience turnover. This specification adds a term
capturing the effect of mean distributor size to control for
size-related processes such as buyer’s market power. As we
hypothesized, turnover has a positive and significant effect
on exit. At its mean value, audience turnover increases pro-
ducers’ exit rates by about 21.3 percent. The specification of
model 4 has a better fit than the baseline (2[L4 – L1] = 80.8,
p < .001 for 3 d.f., and AIC is 32467.8). This supports hypoth-
esis 3. A graphical illustration of the effect of audience
turnover on the multiplier of the exit rate is shown in
figure 4.
Model 5 jointly tests the effects of the three explanatory vari-
ables and confirms previous results. Overall, this specification
shows better fit than the intermediate models, providing sup-
port for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3: the likelihood ratio test
shows model 5 is an improvement over any of the previous
specifications as indicated by the LR tests (2[L5 – L1] =
109.7, p < .001 for 5 d.f.; 2[L5 – L2] = 70.3, p < .001 for 4
d.f.; 2[L5 – L3] = 100.3, p < .001 for 4 d.f.; 
2[L5 – L4] = 28.9,
p < .001 for 2 d.f.) and the AIC value (32442.9) as well.
Figure 5 provides visual evidence of the effect of network
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Figure 3. Effect of mean repeated ties on the multiplier of the exit rate.
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Figure 4. Effect of audience turnover on the multiplier of the exit rate.
M
u
lt
ip
lie
r 
o
f 
th
e 
R
at
e
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Audience Turnover
25
20
15
10
5
0
connectivity. The figure illustrates the structure of the domain
in 1920 and 1965. These years allow for a pertinent compari-
son, as they exhibit roughly the same number of incumbents
(298 in 1920 and 310 in 1965), thus allowing us to focus on
the change in connectivity while holding constant the ecologi-
cal density. Circles represent production companies and trian-
gles represent distributors. The black nodes are producer
organizations that will exit the following year. As is apparent
from the picture, these years differ significantly in terms of
network connectivity, which decreases from 35 percent in
1920 to 8 percent in 1965. In line with our theory, this drop in
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Figure 5. The configuration of interorganizational networks between feature film producer and distributor
organizations.
Circles = producer organizations. Darker circles are producer organizations exiting the network in the next
year
Triangles = distributor organizations
Lines = film ties between producer and distributor organizations
Year 1920
Year 1965
connectivity corresponds to an increase in producer organiza-
tions’ exit rate from 53 percent in 1920 to 66 percent in
1965.
The regressions in table 3 examine our hypotheses further in
two ways. Not all producers can benefit from the network-
related processes: whereas the typical member’s life
chances rise with greater structure and stability, the penalties
for a producer organization that defies conformity to socio-
cognitive frames would be amplified. To attract audience
resources, organizations need to engage in focused efforts
by making their offerings available and known (Hannan,
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Table 3
Piecewise Exponential Regression Models of Exit Rates of Feature Film
Producer Organizations— Robustness Checks*
Variable Model 6 Model 7
Tenure 0 ≤ u = 1 –0.554 1.377•••
(0.632) (0.363)
Tenure 1 ≤ u = 2 –2.639••• –0.702•
(0.635) (0.369)
Tenure 2 ≤ u = 4 –2.682••• –0.746••
(0.636) (0.370)
Tenure 4 ≤ u = 10 –3.055••• –1.123•••
(0.638) (0.371)
Tenure 10 ≤ u = 20 –3.274••• –1.331•••
(0.645) (0.382)
Tenure > 20 –3.786••• –1.874•••
(0.669) (0.431)
Organizational size –0.919••• –0.910•••
(0.051) (0.051)
Vertical integration –0.511••• –0.518•••
(0.065) (0.065)
Number of network partners –0.194••• –0.200•••
(0.066) (0.066)
Repeated ties producer org.–distributor org. –0.163••• –0.165•••
(0.042) (0.043)
Repeated ties individual producer–distributor org. –0.021 –0.023•
(0.012) (0.012)
Niche width 0.923••• 0.456•••
(0.282) (0.146)
Membership in main component –0.185••• –0.183•••
(0.041) (0.041)
Density of producer organizations –0.027••• –0.018•••
(0.004) (0.002)
Density of producer organizations2 0.010••• 0.008•••
(0.001) (0.001)
Density delay 0.003••• 0.003•••
(0.001) (0.001)
Density of distributor organizations –0.019••• –0.018•••
(0.003) (0.002)
Mass 0.632•• 0.063
(0.253) (0.045)
Weekly theater attendance 0.004 –0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Television penetration –0.013•• –0.024
(0.004) (0.005)
Market concentration –0.158 –0.339
(0.154) (0.163)
Studio-system period –0.073 –0.054
(0.148) (0.142)
Post-Paramount period 0.221 0.205
(0.146) (0.148)
Connectivity –0.623•• –0.355•••
(0.253) (0.086)
Mean repeated ties –0.175••• –0.057•••
(0.046) (0.013)
Mean audience size 0.383••• 0.098•••
(0.113) (0.014)
Mean audience tenure –0.297••• –0.291•••
(0.032) (0.032)
(continued on next page)
Pólos, and Carroll, 2007). Given that organizations have a
finite capacity for engagement, paying attention to a broader,
more diverse set of audiences means less attention paid to
establishing and communicating a clear fit to each (Hsu,
2006). One implication is that increases in niche width must
decrease the level of an organization’s engagement across its
diverse positions, resulting in lowered audience appeal
across these positions. Targeting a broad niche makes it diffi-
cult for organizations to clearly establish their fit with target-
ed taste positions, and broader niches present patterns of
features that lack conformity to audience-relevant schemas
(Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007). If so, this lack of confor-
mity limits legitimation via a reduction in consensus and
entails a higher hazard of exit. Genres reflect sets of posi-
tions that are relevant for producers and audiences alike. Hsu
(2006) found that films that target more genres generally
attract a larger proportion of audiences. At the same time,
however, these films diminish the audience’s ability to clearly
perceive and identify an organization’s fit within established
market positions. In our context, we expect that lack of con-
formity associated with producer organizations that operate
in broader genre niches will increase penalties under condi-
tions of greater connectivity, greater repeated interactions,
and lower turnover. Model 7 includes interaction effects with
niche width and shows significant effects, as expected.
Moreover, model 8, in table 4 considers one other factor that
would lead to consensus, the role of homogeneity in the
audience. We expected higher homogeneity among audience
members to be more congenial to the development of con-
sensus. Model 8 includes as a measure of homogeneity the
average niche overlap across genres among distributor orga-
nizations. Though increasing overlap among distributors can
increase distributors’ exit due to crowding processes, the
impact on producer organizations can be beneficial: with
more competitive overlap among audience members, there
should be more agreement about the features candidates
ought to present. This effect shows net of the density of dis-
tributor organizations. Consistent with this logic, we find that
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Table 3 (continued)
Piecewise Exponential Regression Models of Exit Rates of Feature Film
Producer Organizations—Robustness Checks*
Variable Model 6 Model 7
Audience turnover 0.379••• 0.341•••
(0.061) (0.051)
Niche width  Connectivity 0.331••
(0.147)
Niche width  Mean repeated ties 0.108••
(0.045)
Niche width  Audience turnover –0.080•••
(0.021)
Audience overlap –0.332•••
(0.053)
Log-likelihood –16166.217 –16193.42
Chi-square vs. null 7238.46••• 7186.71•••
Chi-square vs. model 1 158.62••• 109.72•••
AIC 32394.43 32405.81
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 9,316 firm/year spells.
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Table 4
Piecewise Exponential Regression Models of Exit Rates of Feature Film Producer Organizations—Robustness
Checks*
Variable Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Tenure 0 ≤ u = 1 0.732• 0.618• 1.344••• 0.480 0.523•
(0.394) (0.342) (0.334) (0.331) (0.320)
Tenure 1 ≤ u = 2 –1.341••• –1.609••• –1.207••• –1.588••• –1.549•••
(0.399) (0.349) (0.341) (0.338) (0.337)
Tenure 2 ≤ u = 4 –1.377••• –1.691••• –1.361••• –1.633••• –1.593•••
(0.399) (0.350) (0.341) (0.338) (0.338)
Tenure 4 ≤ u = 10 –1.766••• –2.104••• –1.716••• –2.013••• –1.973•••
(0.399) (0.352) (0.344) (0.340) (0.339)
Tenure 10 ≤ u = 20 –1.962••• –2.212••• –1.986••• –2.216••• –2.179•••
(0.411) (0.365) (0.356) (0.352) (0.351)
Tenure > 20 –2.497••• –2.733••• –2.570••• –2.781••• –2.711•••
(0.459) (0.435) (0.406) (0.423) (0.404)
Organizational size –0.908••• –1.093••• –2.224••• –0.912••• –0.911•••
(0.052) (0.061) (0.062) (0.051) (0.051)
Vertical integration –0.494••• 0.349••• –0.509••• –0.509•••
(0.066) (0.070) (0.065) (0.065)
Number of network –0.196••• –0.167•• 0.420••• –0.191••• –0.195•••
—partners (0.066) (0.069) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Repeated ties producer org.– –0.181••• –0.103•• 0.201••• –0.160••• –0.159•••
—distributor org. (0.044) (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043)
Repeated ties individual producer– –0.020• –0.019 0.029••• –0.023• –0.023•
—distributor org. (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Niche width 0.511••• 0.512••• 0.462••• 0.564••• 0.433•••
(0.141) (0.144) (0.137) (0.136) (0.141)
Membership in main –0.157••• –0.199••• –0.194••• –0.175••• –0.188•••
—component (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Density of producer –0.017••• –0.015••• –0.023••• –0.016••• –0.017•••
—organizations (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Density of producer 0.007••• 0.006••• 0.008••• 0.006••• 0.007•••
—organizations2 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Density delay 0.002••• 0.003••• 0.006••• 0.003••• 0.003•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Density of distributor –0.019••• –0.018••• –0.019••• –0.018••• –0.010•••
—organizations (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Mass 0.115•• 0.118• 0.191••• 0.131••• 0.090•
(0.051) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047)
Weekly theater attendance –0.001 –0.001 –0.006 –0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Television penetration –0.003 –0.003 –0.007• –0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Market concentration 0.224 –0.005 0.207 –0.005 –0.137
(0.171) (0.152) (0.145) (0.145) (0.152)
Studio-system period –0.438••• –0.477••• –0.647••• –0.402••• –0.490•••
(0.132) (0.136) (0.129) (0.130) (0.134)
Post-Paramount period 0.305•• 0.251• –0.009 0.271• 0.312••
(0.142) (0.145) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142)
Connectivity –0.331••• –0.357••• –0.322••• –0.314••• –0.429•••
(0.084) (0.088) (0.084) (0.084) (0.089)
Mean repeated ties –0.041••• –0.043••• –0.066••• –0.038••• –0.050•••
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mean audience size 0.029•• 0.041••• 0.049••• 0.032•• 0.035•••
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Mean audience tenure –0.178••• –0.185••• –0.249••• –0.184••• –0.215•••
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Audience turnover 0.128••• 0.134••• 0.220••• 0.144••• 0.282•••
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.055)
Size > 1 –1.915•••
(0.045)
Cumulative size 0.001
(0.000)
Industry age –0.045•••
(0.013)
Log-likelihood –15747.316 –15372.359 –15092.723 –16197.351 –16191.43
(continued on next page)
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Observations (firm/year spells) 9,151 8,044 9,316 9,316 9,316
Chi-square vs. null 6921.54••• 7414.77••• 10973.32••• 7096.62••• 7108.22•••
AIC 31550.63 30798.72 30243.45 32452.7 32440.86
Chi-square vs. model 1 (same obs) 104.07••• 105.19••• 2311.11••• 101.86••• 113.70•••
AIC of model 1 (same obs) 31644.7 30893.91
Variable Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Tenure 0 ≤ u = 1 0.055 –0.038 0.677•• –0.892•
(0.323) (0.383) (0.327) (0.468)
Tenure 1 ≤ u = 2 –2.022••• –2.102••• –1.393••• –2.957•••
(0.330) (0.389) (0.334) (0.472)
Tenure 2 ≤ u = 4 –2.078••• –2.154••• –1.452••• –3.015•••
(0.330) (0.389) (0.334) (0.472)
Tenure 4 ≤ u = 10 –2.460••• –2.523••• –1.822••• –3.395•••
(0.332) (0.390) (0.334) (0.474)
Tenure 10 ≤ u = 20 –2.645••• –2.748••• –2.019••• –3.591•••
(0.344) (0.403) (0.348) (0.484)
Tenure > 20 –3.164••• –3.278••• –2.555••• –4.112•••
(0.397) (0.448) (0.402) (0.523)
Organizational size –0.920••• –0.915••• –0.912••• –0.917•••
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Vertical integration –0.506••• –0.512••• –0.512••• –0.518•••
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Number of network –0.190••• –0.193••• –0.220••• –0.178•••
—partners (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Repeated ties producer org.– –0.152••• –0.159••• –0.168••• –0.153•••
—distributor org. (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Repeated ties individual producer– –0.028•• –0.023• –0.024• –0.027••
—distributor org. (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Niche width 0.704••• 0.831••• 0.319••• 0.838•••
(0.132) (0.148) (0.122) (0.116)
Membership in main –0.182••• –0.185••• –0.189••• –0.174•••
—component (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Density of producer –0.012••• –0.016••• –0.014••• –0.011•••
—organizations (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Density of producer 0.005••• 0.007••• 0.004••• 0.005•••
—organizations2 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Density delay 0.003••• 0.003••• 0.003••• 0.003•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Density of distributor –0.016••• –0.016••• –0.016••• –0.015•••
—organizations (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mass 0.083• 0.149••• 0.141••• 0.133•••
(0.045) (0.050) (0.048) (0.047)
Weekly theater attendance 0.001 0.005 –0.004 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Television penetration 0.004 –0.001 0.002 0.004•
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Market concentration 0.051 –0.056 0.038 0.082
(0.141) (0.143) (0.139) (0.141)
Studio-system period –0.333••• –0.359••• –0.532••• –0.574•••
(0.126) (0.132) (0.123) (0.125)
Post-Paramount period –0.146 0.191 0.158 0.277•••
(0.154) (0.141) (0.101) (0.102)
Connectivity –0.597••• –0.381•••
(0.083) (0.086)
Mean repeated ties –0.040••• –0.031•• –0.062••• –0.040•••
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mean audience size 0.031•• 0.047•••
(0.012) (0.014)
Mean audience tenure –0.046••• –0.201•••
(0.006) (0.028)
Audience turnover 0.094••• 0.155•••
(0.026) (0.039)
Table 4 (continued)
Piecewise Exponential Regression Models of Exit Rates of Feature Film Producer Organizations—Robustness
Checks*
Variable Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(continued on next page)
audience overlap has a negative effect on producers’ exit
rates.
To test the robustness of the analyses, we estimated addi-
tional models, presented in table 4. Due to the use of a
three-year window in analyzing ties, observations for the peri-
od 1912–1914 could have biased our results. Model 8 checks
sensitivity to this time window, estimating exit rates by omit-
ting the first three years of observation, and shows our
results are unaffected by the estimations made for the abbre-
viated observation period. Model 9 replicates the full model
by restricting the analysis to non-integrated production com-
panies. Previous results are unchanged. In the film industry,
producer organizations may be created for the production of
a single film. Lack of information in the data sources on orga-
nizational goals prevented us from distinguishing between
organizations that did not make a second film because the
first one was not successful and organizations that purposely
were designed for single productions. Model 10 attempts to
address this issue by including a dummy variable to control
for producer organizations that made more than one film.
Organizations that made at least two films have lower exit
rates, but we continue to find support for our hypotheses.
Model 11 includes a measure of cumulative size. We find
that controlling for the number of previous films made over
the life of the organization does not affect producer exit—
cumulative size probably causes the lack of significance of
the first time piece. Model 12 addresses the concern that
legitimation is better represented as a time-varying function
(Hannan, 1997). We included a variable measuring industry
age to control for time trends. This specification indicates
that industry age reduces exit, but it leaves our previous find-
ings unaffected. Models 13 and 14 provide alternative specifi-
cations to network connectivity. Model 13 replaces our con-
nectivity variable with the components-based connectivity
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Component connectivity –0.020•••
(0.005)
Average network density –0.057••
(0.026)
Oldtimer ratio 0.043•••
(0.007)
Prior exits 0.003••
(0.002)
Newcomer ratio 0.911•••
(0.223)
Prior entries 0.001
(0.002)
Log-likelihood –16201.32 –16201.906 –16184.671 –16214.015
Observations (firm/year spells) 9,316 9,316 9,316 9,316
Chi-square vs. null 7076.84••• 7071.13••• 7152.88••• 7039.98•••
AIC 32458.64 32459.81 32423.34 32482.03
Chi-square vs. model 1 (same obs) 93.92••• 92.75••• 127.22••• 68.53•••
AIC of model 1 (same obs)
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4 (continued)
Piecewise Exponential Regression Models of Exit Rates of Feature Film Producer Organizations—Robustness
Checks*
Variable Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
measure 1/C, where C is the number of network compo-
nents. Consistent with hypothesis 1, this variable has a nega-
tive and significant effect on exit, suggesting that increasing
(or decreasing) connectivity in the communication network
between audience and candidates—as indicated by lower (or
higher) values of C—enhances (or harms) candidates’ sur-
vival. Model 14 replaces the measure of network connectivity
with a variable gauging the average degree of the network. A
higher degree of vertices suggests a more connected net-
work because vertices have more ties. Accordingly, we used
the average degree of all vertices as an alternative proxy for
the interconnectivity of the domain. The effect on exit is neg-
ative and significant, in line with our original measure, but
compared with these alternative specifications, our chosen
measure produces better fit, as suggested by the LR tests
and AIC values of models 13 and 14 vs. model 5. The next
two specifications present alternative measurements of the
audience turnover variable and combine a measure of popula-
tion dynamics with one of density. Traditionally, density
dependence processes are alternatives to population dynam-
ics (Baum and Shipilov, 2006). While density dependence
focuses on levels of density itself, population dynamics focus
on how current founding and failure rates are related to
changes in density (Tucker et al., 1988). Recent trends in eco-
logical studies have abandoned analysis of population dynam-
ics effects, but some authors argue that the issue deserves
further examination (Baum and Shipilov, 2006). Our alterna-
tive measurement revisits prior work on population dynamics
by creating a direct link between transitory flows and the
density of audience members but uses audience rather than
population dynamics and considers an interpretation of the
turnover process that is distinct from resource availability or
the use of vicarious information (Kalnins, Swaminathan, and
Mitchell, 2006). Model 15 replaces the variables measuring
the age of distributor organizations with the lagged propor-
tion of distributor organizations that exit the network. More
member exits induce higher audience discontinuity and in
turn increase exit rates. Consistent with this prediction,
turnover still has a positive and significant effect on produc-
ers’ exit rates. Model 16 presents another measurement of
turnover, the proportion of new entrants in the audience.
Increasing entry is expected to intensify discontinuity in audi-
ences. In accordance, an increasing rate of entry into the
audience increases the exit of producer organizations, but the
observed effects of audience turnover may instead reflect
turnover in the focal population. To control for this, models 15
and 16 add the number of prior exits and entries of producer
organizations, respectively, and leave our main findings unaf-
fected. In unreported analyses, we added the effect of com-
petitive intensity measured by age-size interactions (Barnett,
1997), but the results did not modify the findings we present.
As firms exit the population, their ties to distributors dissolve,
thus altering the properties of the network to which they
belong. To partially account for this endogenous process of
network causation in separate analyses, we estimated our
full model using multiple time frames for the connectivity
measure. We employed two-, three- and four-year lags, and
the results were robust to all such specifications.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The macro changes that produce legitimation are just starting
to receive systematic analysis (Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll,
2007: 298). Institutional scholars and organizational ecologists
have recently begun to converge on the idea that legitimacy
originates from consensus among certain agents (an audi-
ence) on which features and behaviors of an organization (a
candidate) should be viewed as appropriate and desirable
within a widespread system of social codes. An audience-
based theory of legitimation posits that various social audi-
ences develop expectations about what organizations can or
should do and accordingly evaluate organizational action. Can-
didate organizations that pass the code test are legitimated in
the social environment. One of the consequences is that
they enjoy greater survival.
Two central but undeveloped features of this theory concern
how the audience is structured and evolves in tandem with
the organizations it scrutinizes and how interactions between
audiences and candidates shape the formation of consensus
around codes (Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2007: 302–303).
This study examines three main conditions under which audi-
ences reach and maintain consensus: (1) network connectivi-
ty, which facilitates the transmission of social norms about
appropriate behavior and signals membership acceptance cri-
teria, (2) tie repetition, which allows audiences to reinforce
informed opinions about candidates’ conformity to expecta-
tions; and (3) audience turnover, which affects the stability of
the application of social codes, thereby increasing candidates’
uncertainty about default codes. In the context of the U.S.
film industry, we analyzed the exchange ties between feature
film producer and distributor organizations. We considered
distributor organizations as audience members for the pro-
ducer organizations, seeking to release their films and found
that the first two conditions increase producers’ survival in
the market, while the third reduces it.
Our analysis of patterns of exchange between feature film
producer and distributor organizations offers evidence that
the formation and operation of social codes depends on the
network connecting organizational populations and their audi-
ences. This has an important implication for ecological theory.
First, legitimation is a process driven not only by numerical
proliferation (or density) of organizations; its roots are also to
be found in the interactions among these organizations.
Moreover, legitimation must not be considered static; it has a
dynamic nature. Current ecological theory considers legitima-
tion a process that takes place during a population’s early his-
tory. Secured once and for all during a population’s youth,
legitimation tends to be inert and becomes increasingly
“sticky” (Hannan, 1997). Our analysis shows that the
process of legitimation does not end with the crystallization
of codes during the emergence of the organizational form.
Legitimacy can be assessed at different levels and on differ-
ent dimensions (Ruef and Scott, 1998). During the early life
of a population, the legitimation process mainly assesses the
legitimacy of a new organizational form, which the candi-
dates are responsible for imprinting according to audiences’
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expectations (Perretti, Negro, and Lomi, 2008). Once an orga-
nizational form is established, the legitimation process shifts
to a different level and mainly assesses the legitimacy of the
candidates to obtain resources from the social environment.
Even if the organizational form is established, the codes that
audiences develop to assess candidates’ claims to existing
resources may change without replacing the existing form. A
film producer organization that was once granted resources
in the 1930s probably would not in the 1960s, not necessarily
because the organizational form or the product features were
radically different (a movie was still a movie, projected in
large-screen theaters, with actors, directors, etc.), but
because the codes about what a producer should be had
changed. At this level, legitimacy refers to a laborious
process in constant development. Also, while existing
accounts of the legitimation process focus on direct contact
among audience members, we show that social codes can
develop via contact with candidate organizations. In this
sense, an audience-based interpretation of legitimation inte-
grates with research on interorganizational networks indicat-
ing that social codes can develop and transfer in a mediated
way (Romo and Schwartz, 1995; Uzzi, 1999; Zuckerman,
1999, 2003; Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001).
Our study has further ramifications for ecological theory.
First, it adds to research on community ecology (Ruef, 2000;
Sørensen, 2004), whose studies mainly focus on density-
based measures of resource flows between forms of organi-
zations. Although this literature has stressed the importance
of looking at the web of relations within and across commu-
nities’ members (e.g., Wade, 1995), the structural and behav-
ioral characteristics of this network have not been explicitly
examined. Our findings highlight the presence of processes
that link interdependent populations and have effects on vital
rates that are distinct from density, namely, the structure of
the exchange networks between buyer and supplier organiza-
tions. Focusing on the communication network between
organizational populations and their audiences and, in particu-
lar, the conditions fostering the formation and diffusion of
consensus, we shed light on the process by which standards
like technical design can become taken for granted.
Second, the use of ecological models has attracted interest
as well as criticism. Baum and Powell (1995) have argued
that legitimation is a process only weakly related to ecologi-
cal measures like density and that changes in density are
proxies for other processes, such as the evolution of a popu-
lation’s interdependencies with its environment. Baum and
Oliver (1992) used similar arguments to justify the lack of
support for density dependence in the population of day care
centers in Toronto: after controlling for the relational density
of institutional linkages between day care centers and gov-
ernmental agencies, initial increases in population density
showed only competitive effects. Baum and Oliver (1992)
attributed this finding to the population’s increasing embed-
dedness in its environment and concluded that relational den-
sity is a more direct specification of legitimating effects. In
the absence of left-truncated schemes, our examination of
population density and relational embeddedness lends sup-
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port to both density-based and non-density-based mecha-
nisms driving the legitimation process (Sine, Haveman, and
Tolbert, 2005).
Third, some organizational populations show complex evolu-
tionary trajectories in which a decline in density is followed
by a resurgence. Ecologists have developed various explana-
tions—including density delay, time-dependent heterogeneity,
and resource partitioning—for what is considered an anomaly
relative to predictions of the density-dependence model. The
population of feature film producer organizations experienced
such a resurgence. According to resource partitioning, when
the number of organizations declines, the market share held
by a few firms often increases. In a highly concentrated
industry, specialist organizations often find small pockets of
resources on which they can exist (Carroll, 1985). This, in
turn, leads to lower mortality and, eventually, to a larger pop-
ulation. Our study suggests another mechanism for resur-
gence based on the structural and relational characteristics of
interorganizational ties. This mechanism has the advantage of
allowing reversibility without imposing strict time-dependent
assumptions (Hannan, 1997).
At a broader level, our study also contributes to the dialogue
between ecological and social network research on organiza-
tions. On the one hand, ecology informs network studies by
demonstrating that embeddedness in social contexts has
meaning beyond direct ties and can be a function of mem-
bership in an ecological community (Hannan, Pólos, and Car-
roll, 2007). On the other hand, network studies inform ecolo-
gy by bringing evidence that the system of connections to
the environment can influence organizational dynamics
beyond the discrete segmentation of populations. The net-
work therefore represents a context, not a mere juxtaposition
of ties (White, 1992).
Despite support for the hypotheses, this study has important
limitations that in turn suggest directions for future work.
First, our study examines the conditions under which consen-
sus is more likely to be reached, strengthened, and pre-
served, but without directly measuring consensus. We
inferred the existence of agreement within the audience on
the candidates to accept or to exclude if the identified condi-
tions were satisfied altogether. Also, we did not measure
codes directly, even though the qualitative evidence present-
ed in the paper provides a glimpse into what those codes
looked like in our setting during the study period and how
they shaped agents’ behavior (Bordwell, Staiger, and Thomp-
son, 1985). More fine-grained data on the relationships
between producer and distributor organizations, such as data
on contractual deals, public discourse, and actual resource
flows from distributors to producers, but also a different
research design, perhaps a combination of textual and histori-
cal analysis, would make it possible to overcome some of
the limitations of the study. Second, questions about the gen-
eralizability of our findings can only be answered by examin-
ing other contexts. Organizations in the film industry operate
in a context fraught with great uncertainties, both on the sup-
ply and demand side (Faulkner and Anderson, 1987). This
results in self-reinforcing dynamics of embeddedness in
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which producers and distributors establish strong ties even in
the face of negative returns to such relationships (Sorenson
and Waguespack, 2006). Repeated ties therefore may be a
more cogent factor in explaining life chances here than in
other contexts. The film industry has also witnessed shifts in
the structure of market exchanges. Horizontal ties between
producers have increased substantially since the 1970s, and
an analysis extending to more recent periods could examine
horizontal rather than vertical ties. Third, the study examines
only a simple set of network characteristics. The choice of
connectivity, repeated ties, and turnover in the buyer network
directly reflects our interest in studying the influence of orga-
nizational network structures beyond the effect of ecological
mechanisms. Future studies might address alternative
exchange forms and their potential effects. Fourth, in this
study, we did not analyze the joint impact of the network
mechanisms that influence audience consensus. Exploratory
analyses suggest that connectivity and repeated ties moder-
ate the deleterious effect of audience turnover on exit. High-
er embeddedness can indeed mitigate the loss of specific
exchange partners but maintain the structure of roles and
identities. Examining such interaction effects represents an
interesting avenue for future research. Yet these findings also
require additional empirical validation, and the underlying the-
oretical mechanisms have to be investigated more deeply. In
this context, future research could also investigate if network
structure interacts with density dependence. A study that
connects the analysis of network ties with ecological dynam-
ics may shed light on relevant open problems, for example,
the fact that density dependence assumed that legitimation
effects are symmetric across the two sides of the peak in
the density distribution. These represent fruitful areas for fur-
ther investigation that we hope will contribute to a better
understanding of the complex and fundamental relationships
linking organizations to their environment.
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